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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
person against the day of an anticipated bankruptcy. While the
principal case is probably sound on its facts and in its result, it
nevertheless suggests the possibility of a transfer in fraud of
creditors by immediate destruction of cancelled checks when they
are the only available record in cases where production of other
more formal records is not required of the bankrupt.
M. S. K.
BiLs -AND Nonre-DmOHAReE-REACQUISITION BEF'ORE M. -
TURITY BY ACCOMMODATION AKER. - D, comaker with P, of a
note for the latter's benefit, purchased it before maturity from the
holder, and after maturity, exercised the confession of judgment
provision in the note to obtain an Ohio judgment against P. D now
brings action against P in West Virginia on the judgment, and P
seeks to enjoin the prosecution of the action. Held, that a state is
required to give full faith and credit to judgments recovered in a
sister state only if such judgment is valid; and that a judgment
rendered by a court of a sister state is not valid unless the court
had jurisdiction; and that a judgment note confers jurisdiction of
the person on the court only so long as the note remains a legal and
subsisting obligation; and that the possession of a note by the
accommodation maker at maturity in his own right was a discharge
of the note, and so the note conferred no jurisdiction on the Ohio
court. Perkins v. HaU.'
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, "A negotiable instru-
ment is discharged: . .. (5) When the principal debtor becomes
the holder of the instrument at or after maturity in his own right. "-'
Two problems immediately present themselves in the instant case.
Is an accommodation maker a principal debtor under the act?'
Did this accommodation maker become the holder of the instrument
at or after maturity? The term principal detor is not defined by
the act, though the person primarily liable is defined as the one
who is by the terms of the instrument absolutely required to pay
117 S. E. (2d) 795 (W. Va. 1941).
2NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 119; Omo GEN. CODE (Page, 1938)
§8224; as amended, W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 46, art. 8, § 1.
3 West Virginia has eliminated this question by substituting the term "per-
son primarily liable" for "principal debtor". An accommodation maker is
absolutely required to pay a note, and is clearly a primary party as defined by
the act. W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie,'1937) c. 46, art, 8, § 1. Accord: Marshall
County Bank v. Fonner, 113 W. Va. 451, 168 S. E. 375 (1933); Rouse v.
Wooten, 140 N. C. 557, 53 S. E. 430 (1906).
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the same.4 The weight of authority is that payment by an accommo-
dation maker at or after maturity discharges the instrument, "
therefore by implication, the accommodation maker is the principal
debtor under the act.6 However, several cases have permitted an
accommodation maker to sue on the instrument itself when forced
to pay after maturity7 one case flatly stating that the accommoda-
tion comaker was only a secondary party.8
In the instant case, the accommodation maker became the
holder of the instrument before maturity, and so was not within
the letter of the section on discharge. Although, under the ma-
jority view, a maker who reacquires a note before maturity may
reissue it before maturity as a valid obligation,' if it is held beyond
maturity, the instrument is discharged." The court here applied
the principle to an accommodation maker, saying that, although
he could have reissued the note as a valid obligation, when he did
not, it was discharged at maturity. The effect is to interpret the
phrase "1ecomes the holder of the instrument at or after maturity
. . ." as meaning "is the holder of the instrument at or after ma-
turity . ." The act denies the accommodation maker the right of
subrogation when he takes up the note at or after maturity, and
this case says the same rule applies when he is holder of the note
at maturity. The accommodation maker or surety is left to his
right of reimbursement.
D. C. H.
4 NEGOTIABLE INsTRUMENTS LAW § 192; OHIo GEN. CoDE (Page, 1938) §
8296; W. VA&. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 46, art. 17, § 2.
r Harris v. King, 113 Cal. App. 357, 298 Pac. 100 (1931); Proctor v. Pyle,
33 Cal. App. (2d) 121, 91 P. (2d) 187 (1939); Gillham v. Troeekler, 304 Ill.
App. 596, 26 N. E. (2d) 413 (1940) ; Kage v. Oates, 208 S. W. 126 (Mo. App.
1919); Kelley v. Briggs, 290 S. W. 105 (Mo. App. 1927); Dillenbeck v. Dygert,
97 N. Y. 303 (1884).
6 In re Nashville Laundry Co., 240 Fed. 795 (M. . Tenn. 1917) ; Roberson-
Ruffin Co. v. Spain, 173 N. C. 23, 91 S. E. 361 (1917).
70'Neal v. Stuart, 281 Fed. 715 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922); Fox v. Kroeger, 119
Tex. 511, 35 S. W. (2d) 679, 77 A. L. R. 663 (1931). See Chaffee, Beacquisition
of a Negotiable Instrument by a Prior Party (1921) 21 CoL. L. REv. 538, in
which he favors the allowance of suits on the instrument by a comaker who is
only an accommodation party and who is required to pay the instrument.
S Pease v. Syler, 78 Wash. 24, 138 Pac. 310 (1914).
0 Peltier v. McFerson, 67 Colo. 505, 186 Pac. 524 (1920); Chicago Title &
Trust Co. v. Biddermen, 275 fll. App. 457 (1934); Horn v. Nicholas, 139 Tenn.
453, 201 S. W. 756, 1918E L. R. A. 157 (1918). See exhaustive note in 1918E
L. R. A. 170. Contra: Stevens v. Hannan, 86 Alich. 305, 48 N. W. 951 (1891).
10 Gordon v. Wansey, 21 Cal. 77 (1862) ; Peltier v. MeFerson, 67 Colo. 505,
186 Pac. 524 (1920); Walton v. Young, 26 La. Ann. 164 (1874); Harmer v.
Steele, 4 Exch. 1, 154 Eng. Rep. R. 1100 (1851).
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